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Can a plaintiff bring suit on an oral contract for the sale of goods
or investment securities within the Uniform Commercial Code
Statute of Frauds and then, by pre-trial discovery procedure or at
trial, ask the defendant to admit that the oral contract was in fact
made, and by such an admission enforce the contract? He can, be-
cause "the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his
. . . testimony. . . in court" that the contract was made. The con-
tract is therefore enforceable under this admission provision of Uni-
form Commercial Code Sections 2-201(3)(b) and 8-319(d).L-The ad-
mission thus obtained is known as a compelled or involuntary admis-
sion because the defendant can be compelled by the contempt power
of the court to respond to plaintiff's request for the admission.
The Code admission provision had no counterpart in pre-Code
sales Statutes of Frauds.2 As Professors Lon Fuller and Melvin Eisen-
berg have remarked, if an involuntary admission does make such an
oral contract enforceable, the impact of the admission provision is
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. B.A., Washington and Lee University;
LL.B., University of Florida.
I These sections are set out in the text at notes 31 & 32 infra. The contract is not
enforceable, however, beyond the quantity and, in the case of investment securities,
beyond the price admitted.
I E.g., UNIFORM SALES Acr § 4.
2 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXI
striking.' Pre-Code law allowed a party to defeat an action on an oral
contract by pleading the Statute of Frauds even though he recognized
its existence and would admit it in court. That is, it legalized his
reneging on a contract-which he would, under questioning, admit
making.' The impact of the new involuntary admission procedure is
to eliminate this situation.
This impact has not, however, been generally recognized because
the propriety of this use of the involuntary admission is viewed as
uncertain by a majority of Code commentators. The minority of
commentators' who approve the use of the involuntary admission to
enforce an oral contract is, on the other hand, unanimously supported
by the half-dozen courts which have considered the question.7 The
decisions of these courts are sound and the doubts of the majority of
the commentators are without foundation.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE CODE STATUTE OF FRAUDS ADMISSION
PROVISION
Pre-Code sales Statutes of Frauds provided for enforcement of
oral contracts within the Statute only by written memorandum, re-
ceipt and acceptance or payment In the absence of an admission
provision in the pre-code Statutes, the courts generally refused to
allow a defendant's in-court admission to satisfy the Statute. When,
pre-Code, a defendant, in an action on a contract within the Statute,
did not plead the Statute and admitted the oral contract in his an-
swer, some courts held that the oral contract was enforceable because
of the defendant's pleaded admission? A sounder reason for such a
position, however, was that the defendant waived the affirmative
Statute of Frauds defense by not asserting it." When the defendant
3 L. FULLER & M. EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 1003 (1972). Their comment is
set out in note 52 infra.
See text accompanying notes 8-22 infra.
See text accompanying notes 51-55 infra.
See text accompanying notes 76-85 infra.
7 See text accompanying notes 121-139 infra.
E.g., UNIFORM SALES ACT § 4.
Sandling v. Kearney, 154 N.C. 596, 70 S.E. 942 (1911) (land transaction). See 1
S. WILLISTON, SALES § 101, at 251 (rev. ed. 1948); Annot. 22 A.L.R. 735 (1923).
" Early procedure codes were divided on the question of whether the Statute of
Frauds had to be affirmatively pleaded, C. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 420-21 (1928); but
modem codes generally designate it an affirmative defense. See, e.g., FED. R. Cw. P.
8(c); N.Y. R. Crv. PRAC. 3018(b). Failure to plead an affirmative defense results in its
waiver, 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1278, at 339
(1969).
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in such an action did plead the Statute of Frauds, yet in his answer
admitted the oral contract or later in the action admitted it sua
sponte, most pre-Code courts read the Statute strictly and refused to
allow the admission to make the oral contract enforceable." Some of
these courts were influenced by the fear of encouraging defendant's
perjury.' 2 Other courts held, however, that such a voluntary admis-
sion by the defendant did make the oral contract enforceable. Some
courts so held on the ground that the admission, particularly where
made in a signed pleading or deposition, satisfied the written memo-
randum provision of the Statute.'3 An occasional court so held, not
on the basis of any provision of the Statute, but because the "purpose
of the Statute" had been satisfied as the defendant's admission
showed that plaintiff was not fraudulently misrepresenting the exist-
ence of the contract."
The few courts which squarely faced the involuntary admission
question prior to the Code generally encountered additional difficul-
ties.' 5 Two often-cited cases, Cash v. Clark'6 and Smith v. Muss,"
held that an involuntary admission did not satisfy the pre-Code-Stat-
ute, reasoning first, that to allow it to do so would wrongfully deprive
" Thomas J. Baird Inv. Co. v. Harris, 209 F. 291 (8th Cir. 1913) (land contract,
admission in pleading); Cornett v. Clere, 193 Ky. 590, 236 S.W. 1036 (1922) (land
contract, admission in pleading). See C. BROWNE, STATUTE OF FRAUDS § 515, at 566 (4th
ed. 1880); 4 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTs § 568, at 32 n.11 (3d ed. 1961); Stevens, Ethics
and the Statute of Frauds, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 355 (1952); Annot. 22 A.L.R. 723 (1923).
'2 See text accompanying notes 97-109 and cases cited in note 98 infra; Stevens,
Ethics and the Statute of Frauds, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 355 (1952).
" Pollin v. Perkins, 223 Md. 532, 165 A.2d 908 (1960) (land contract, admission
in testimony); McCall v. Lee, 182 N.C. 114, 108 S.E. 390 (1921) (land transaction,
signed pleading a memorandum). See 2A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 519, at 757, 760 (1950);
L. VOLD, SALES § 22, at 133 (2d ed. 1959); 1 S. WILLISON, SALES § 101, at 251 (rev. ed.
1948); Note, 38 CORNELL L.Q. 604 (1953).
" Carlsen v. Carlsen, 49 N.J. Super. 130, 139 A.2d 309 (1958) (land agreement,
admission in court); Zlotziver v. Zlotziver, 355 Pa. 299, 49 A.2d 779 (1946) (land
agreement, admission in testimony); Huffime v. McCampbell, 149 Tenn. 47, 257 S.W.
80 (1923) (land agreement, admission in voluntary deposition). See 2 A. CoRmIN,
CoNTRAcTs § 519, at 761 (1950).
'1 Huffine v. McCampbell, 149 Tenn. 47, 257 S.W. 80 (1923) (land agreement,
dictum); Davis v. Stambaugh, 163 1ll. 557, 45 N.E. 170 (1896) (land agreement, admis-
sion compelled by court). See 2 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 519, at 758 (1950); Degnan,
The Evidence Law of Discovery: Exclusion of Evidence Because of Fear of Perjury, 43
TEX. L. REv. 435, 447 (1965).
" 61 Mo. App. 636 (1895) (admission in compelled deposition).
' 203 Misc. 356, 117 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1952), app. den., 281 App. Div. 957,
122 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1953) (lumber contract, admission in compelled deposition in prior
action), noted in 38 CORNELL L.Q. 604 (1953). See discussion of the case in text accom-
panying notes 58 & 59 and in note 68 infra.
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defendant by judicial duress of his right to use the Statute as a bar,'"
and second, that such a doctrine would make the Statute impotent.,9
An additional obstacle to the use of an involuntary admission en-
countered by early pre-Code courts was the then-prevailing attitude
in the law of discovery that one party to an action could not compel
the other to help prove his case. 2 A rare pre-Code case such as
Trossbach v. Trossbach,2' which was hailed by Corbin as showing
"the finest understanding of the purposes of the statute, '22 overcame
all these obstacles and held that the defendant's involuntary admis-
sion in court did make an oral sales contract enforceable.
Thus, prior to the addition of the Code admission provision to the
Statute of Frauds, although some liberal courts allowed satisfaction
by a voluntary admission, the plaintiff was not, except in the rarest
case, permitted to satisfy the Statute by compelling defendant's
admission. As a result, the defendant was permitted, even though he
would admit the oral contract in court, to renege on that contract
with impunity.
Criticism of the pre-Code Statute of Frauds on the ground that
the dishonesty it allowed was as bad or worse than the fraudulent
misrepresentation which it sought to prevent is almost as old as the
Statute itself.23 Leading commentators urged amending the Statute
" See discussion of this objection in text accompanying notes 56 & 57 infra.
" See discussion of this objection in text accompanying notes 68-71 infra.
20 See discussion of this objection in text accompanying notes 94 & 95 infra.
21 185 Md. 47, 42 A.2d 905 (1945). This was an action for specific performance of
an oral contract to sell land. The court held the Statute of Frauds satisfied by defen-
dant's admission of the contract in his testimony in court, saying, "the purpose of the
Statute of Frauds is to protect a party, not from temptation to commit perjury but
from perjured evidence against him." 185 Md. at 55, 42 A.2d at 908. The facts did not
show whether defendant's admission was voluntary or involuntary, but the court in
speaking of defendant's temptation to commit perjury was clearly referring to the
situation where defendant is asked by his opponent to admit the contract, for the
temptation occurs only on such questioning.
In Brender v. Stratton, 216 Mich. 166, 184 N.W. 486 (1921), the court held that
testimony, both voluntary and involuntary, which admitted the oral land contract
satisfied the Statute of Frauds.
11 2 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 519, at 761 (1950). See also Id., § 317, at 142.
Williston also approved the Trossbach decision. 4 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACrs §
267A, at 19-20 (3d ed. 1961).
21 Burdick, A Statute for Promoting Fraud, 16 COLUM. L. Rsv. 273 (1916). Corbin
stated, "It is believed by many that . . . the statute perpetrates more injustice than
it prevents," and "gain in the prevention of fraud is attained by the Statute. . . at
the expense of permitting persons who have in fact made oral promises to break those
promises with impunity and to cause disappointment and loss to honest men." 2 A.
CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 275, at 38 (1950). Stevens found the welshing permitted by the
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to control this abuse. Williston for instance, advocated legislation
"liberalizing the means of enforcing oral contracts once these have
been found to exist. '24 Similarly, Corbin suggested that "[a]n
amendment to the statute would probably be desirable providing
that it shall not be effective as a defense except to a party who is
willing to submit himself to examination in court on the merits of the
case and who under oath denies making the promise as alleged.
' 2 5
In 1954, Parliament repealed the English Statute of Frauds provi-
Statute contrary to "conscience and morals." Stevens, Ethics and the Statute of
Frauds, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 355, 356 (1952). Willis concluded that the Statute "no longer
[prevents] fraud, if [it] ever did, but rather [is] a cause of fraud." Willis, The
Statute of Frauds-A Legal Anachronism, 3 IND. L.J. 427, 541 (1928). G. BOGERT, W.
BRITTON & W. HAWKLAND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES AND SECURITY 23
(4th ed. 1962); Note, 38 CORNELL L.Q. 604 (1953); Note, Statute of Frauds: Section
Seventeen in the Light of Two and a Half Centuries, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 303 (1928).
24 3 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 448, at 347 (3d ed. 1960). See also Stevens, Ethics
and the Statute of Frauds, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 355, 356, 381 (1952). That commentator
recommended "changing the law so that it will conform with conscience and morals"
and that "[tihe statute should not be recognized as a defense except where the
defendant can and does deny the contracting." Id.
1 2 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 257, at 13 (1950). In addition, the New York Law
Revision Commission, in a study prior to its well-known critique of the UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE, recommended amending the Statute of Frauds to make an oral contract
enforceable when defendant voluntarily or involuntarily admitted it in court. The
Commission's Report stated:
The ethics of using the Statute of Frauds to avoid an undisputed
agreement have been questioned. The Commission believes that, at
least, the defense should not be available to a party who has admitted
the agreement. This approach is particularly appropriate to the Stat-
ute governing the sale of goods, which is designed to discourage fraud-
ulent claims and not to caution against the making of unwise and ill-
considered promises.
1960 REPORT OF [NEw YORK] LAW REvISION COMMISSION 252-53, Leg. Doc. (1960) No.
65(F) 8, 9.
The Report recommended the addition of the following provision to the Statute
of Frauds relating to the sale of goods, making the oral contract enforceable if:
The party against whom enforcement is sought admits voluntarily or
involuntarily in his pleading or at any other stage of an action or
special proceeding facts which if stated in a memorandum would have
made a sufficient memorandum of the agreement sought to be en-
forced, but the contract is not enforceable under this provision beyond
the quantity of goods admitted.
Id. at 249. The Commission had earlier recommended a similar amendment to the
Statute of Frauds relating to contracts not to be performed within one year. 1953
REPORT OF [NEw YORK] LAW REvISIoN COMMISSION 536, Leg. Doc. (1953) No. 65(0) 4.
Neithe recommendation was enacted into law.
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sions requiring that contracts for the sale of goods be in writing.2
Parliament's study committees had found that "on the whole [the
Statute of Frauds provisions] promote rather than restrain dishon-
esty.
'27
The Uniform Commercial Code draftsmen rejected the English
suggestion that the Statute of Frauds be repealed, determining that
it should be preserved in order to retain its benefits in the prevention
of fraud, but that it should be revised to prevent its use as a device
to evade valid oral contracts.Y To this end, the required contents of
the written memorandum which satisfied the Statute were greatly
simplified; 2 a provision was added allowing satisfaction between
merchants by a written memorandum sent to the party to be
charged;"0 and the Code admission provision was added.
I. THE CODE STATUTE OF FRAUDS ADMISSION PROVISION
Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-201(3)(b), dealing with con-
tracts for the sale of goods, states:
A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of subsec-
tion (1) 3' but which is valid in other respects is enfordeable...
26 Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act, 1954, 2 & 3 Eliz. II, c. 34. See
Note, Contracts: Statute of Frauds, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 581, 585 (1955).
However, the English Statute of Frauds pertaining to contracts of guaranty was
retained because of its "cautionary" function, as was the Statute regarding contracts
for the sale of land because of the "importance, longevity and technicality" of land
transactions. Note, 68 HARV. L. REV. 383, 384 (1954).
LAW REFORM COMMITTEE, FIRST REPORT, CMND. No. 8809 at 3 (1953); See also
LAW REVISION COMMITrEE, SIXTH INTERIM REPORT, CMND. No. 5449 at 11 (1937).
n UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201, Comments 1, 2, & 7. Comment 1 is quoted
in note 43 infra. Professor Hawkland has stated, "The philosophy underlying the
Statute of Frauds as it appears in section 2-201 is that formal requirements for sales
contracts do more good than harm, but that they should be formulated in such a way
that they prevent fraud, and not aid it." W. HAWKLAND, SALES & BuLK SALES 26 (2d
ed. 1958).
2' UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201(1), set out in note 31 infra.
3' UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201(2). Mr. Richard Duesenberg recently stated:
To meet this criticism [that pre-Code Statutes of Frauds permitted
a party to renege on an oral bargain], the Code liberalized certain
rules on how the statute might be satisfied. One of these is found in
section 2-211(3)(b) ....
Richard Duesenberg, Chairman of the Subcommittee on General Provisions, Sales,
Bulk Transfers and Documents of Title of the American Bar Association's Section on
Corporation, Banking and Business Law, 30 Bus. LAw 847, 849 (1975).
31 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201(1) states:
Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of
goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of action
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in
his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract
for sale was made, but the contract is not enforceable under
this provision beyond the quantity of goods admitted
[Footnote added].
Section 8-319(d) dealing with contracts for the sale of investment
securities is to the same effect but adds that the contract is not
enforceable beyond the price admitted.32
IV. DOES THE CODE ADMISSION PROVISION INCLUDE INVOLUNTARY
ADMISSIONS?
Many commentators deny or doubt that the language "admits in
his. . . testimony or otherwise in court" covers admissions made on
the interrogation of an adversary, that is, involuntarily;" and they,
therefore, would read this new language as allowing only voluntary
admissions to satisfy the Statute. But when would a party who has
pleaded the Statute of Frauds voluntarily admit the oral contract in
court and thus give up the defense? He might, of course, admit it
inadvertently. It seems that the only situation in which he would
intentionally admit it and abandon the defense would be when he had
determined during the suit that he wished to rely on another defense
stronger than the Statute, but which required the admission of the
oral contract. One example of this type of defense would be that the
oral contract had been satisfied or released. It is clear, however, that
the above-quoted language was not added to the Statute of Frauds
solely to cover these limited situations.
A. The Ordinary Meaning and Construction of the Admission
Provision
The ordinary meaning of the word "testimony"-evidence given
or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a
contract for sale has been made between the parties and signed by the
party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent
or broker. A writing is not insufficient because it omits or incorrectly
states a term agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable under
this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown in such writing.
22 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-319(d) states:
A contract for the sale of securities is not enforceable by way of action
of defense unless. . . the party against whom enforcement is sought
admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract
was made for sale of a stated quantity of described securities at a
defined or stated price.
" See text accompanying notes 50-55 infra.
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by a witness under oath34-includes all testimony. To read the word
as meaning only evidence given voluntarily and to hold that evidence
given on cross-examination is not "testimony" is clearly unwarranted
unless other language in the Statute or some independent principle
of law compels the limitation. No such language or principle exists.
Furthermore, even if "testimony" could be read to mean only that
testimony given voluntarily, the additional statutory language "or
otherwise" would include that given on examination of the adversary.
Similarly, the ordinary meaning of the word "admit"-to grant or
accept something as true or valid35-is broad enough to include the
acceptance of the truth of a fact in response to a question of an
adversary. The cross-examiner's question "Do you admit that. . .
properly uses the word.31 It is therefore difficult to understand why
eminent commentators have argued that the admission provision
may not apply to involuntary admissions on the ground that this
language is unclear and ambiguous.
A possible source of confusion as to the meaning of "admit" is that
in certain situations the only proper and legal admission is one made
voluntarily and thus, in these situations, its meaning may be said to
be implicitly limited to voluntary admissions. For example, in a fifth
amendment or a privileged-communication situation, the legal prin-
ciple involved can be effective only if the party is privileged to remain
silent; and therefore the only proper admission comes voluntarily, by
waiver of that privilege. It is essential, though, to recognize that this
limitation of the ordinary meaning of "admit" occurs only when a
compelling need exists, such as the need for protection against self-
incrimination or for the encouragement of privileged communica-
tions. It is further necessary to recognize that in the Statute of Frauds
situation there is no need to allow a party to renege on a valid and
admitted oral contract. The law nowhere grants such a right. The
only possible source of a privilege to renege would be the Code Stat-
ute of Frauds itself; but the Statute states that an oral contract is
unenforceable, and hence a party may renege on it, only if there is
no writing, receipt and acceptance, payment or admission specified
by the Statute. Where an admission or one of the other methods for
1' See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1646 (4th ed. 1951); WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 2619 (2d ed. 1957).
3 See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 17 (1970);
WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 35 (2d ed. 1957).
11 Professor Hawkland so uses the word in asking whether plaintiff can compel
defendant on the stand "to admit the fact that an oral contract was made." W.
HAWKLAND, SALES & BULK SALES 31 (2d ed. 1958).
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satisfying the Statute exists, the contract is enforceable. Hence the
Statute of Frauds situation is one where the law does not give a
special right the preservation of which requires that a party be privi-
leged to remain silent, and therefore there is no basis here for limiting
the meaning of "admit" to a voluntary admission.
The Code admission provision does unambiguously apply to invol-
untary admissions. If, however, the provision is ambiguous in this
regard, Uniform Commercial Code Section 1-102 (1) provides that,
"This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its
underlying purposes and policies." The purpose of the original Eng-
lish Statute of Frauds of 1677 was stated in its preamble to be, "For
prevention of many fraudulent practices, which are commonly endea-
vored to be upheld by perjury and subornation of perjury."37 Defen-
dant's admission, voluntary or involuntary, of the oral contract al-
leged by plaintiff insures that plaintiff is not fraudulently proving the
contract by perjured testimony and so accomplishes the original pur-
pose of the Statute.
Are there other functions served by the written memorandum
provision of the sales Statute of Frauds today, in addition to its
original function, which might not be fulfilled by an involuntary
admission? Professor Allan Farnsworth made a study of this question
for the New York Law Revision Commission and rejected as insignifi-
cant both the need of a writing to caution the parties against making
an ill-considered sales agreement and the special need of a writing
found in land contracts. Professor Farnsworth found that "the justifi-
cation of a Statute of Frauds as to the sale of goods must be today,
just as it was in the time of its origin in 1677, its evidentiary function,
the prevention of fraudulent claims.""
3 29 Car. II, c. 3 (1677).
Professor Farnworth's report reads:
Before discussion of the specific problems raised by the existing provi-
sion [of the pre-Code sales Statute of Frauds] and the Code proposal,
it would be well to examine briefly the purpose of such a statute.
Three possible functions are commonly suggested: (1) a cautionary,
(2) a channeling, and (3) an evidentiary function. The first of these
has as its goal the discouragement of bargains hastily entered upon
and is well illustrated by the provision requiring a writing for a prom-
ise to pay the debt of another. While there may be some ground for
the belief that the requirement of a writing in the case of a contract
for the sale of goods has had a healthy in terrorem effect by encourag-
ing buyers and sellers to keep written records, it is doubtful that this
is one of its primary purposes, for it is generally held that the required
memorandum need not have been made with the intent to be bound
or even to make a memorandum and even a repudiation may satisfy
19761
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It may be argued that in the furtherance of this purpose of the
Statute of Frauds to prevent proof of false and fraudulent claims, its
admission provision should be construed, if it is ambiguous, to en-
courage the reduction of all terms of the contract to writing, and that
to allow the involuntary admission of only the fact of the contracting
and the quantity term to satisfy the Statute will improperly discour-
age the reduction of the entire contract to writing. The general desira-
bility of encouraging contracting parties to reduce their entire agree-
ment to writing in order to avoid disputes as to its terms cannot be
denied. 9 However, construing the Statute to prohibit the use of the
involuntary admission has only a minimal and incidental effect in
encouraging the reduction of the full contract to writing; and such
construction is in disregard of another important policy of the Stat-
ute, that of preventing its use as a device to renege on an oral con-
tract. The addition of the involuntary admission procedure to the
Statute has only minimal effect in discouraging a writing since a
writing is still needed where there is any danger of the opposite
party's forgetting the fact of the contracting or the quantity involved
or where he may be willing to perjure himself on these matters. In
the statute. Any cautionary function is thus only incidental to the real
ends of the statute. Nor is a principal end of the statute as to the sale
of goods the channeling of transactions so as to make it easy to identify
those agreements which are legally enforceable. This may be a sub-
stantial function of the statute as to sales of land, but the statute as
to sales of goods may be satisfied not only by a memorandum but also
by part payment or by receipt and acceptance, and from the thou-
sands of cases in which the parties have brought before the courts their
controversies as to these requirements, the channel must indeed be a
murky one.
If the cautionary and channeling effects are negligible, the justifi-
cation of a Statute of Frauds as to the sale of goods must be today,
just as it was in the time of its origin in 1677, its evidentiary function,
the prevention of fraudulent claim claims. And on one point most
would agree-that the statute is not intended to deny enforcement to
agreements admittedly made but lacking in the required formalities.
1960 REPORT OF [NEW YORK] LAW REVISION COMMISSION 259-260, Leg. Doc. (1960) No.
65(F) 8 & 9. The English Parliament came to this same conclusion in repealing the
sales Statute of Frauds while retaining the Statute for contracts of guaranty and for
the sale of land. See text accompanying notes 26 & 27 supra.
See also I. MACNEIL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS, FUNCTIONAL SUCCESS OF
WRITING REQUIREMENT STATUTES 1316 (1971); Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41
COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800-804 (1941); Perillo, The Statute of Frauds in the Light of the
Functions and Dysfunctions of Form, 43 FORDHAM L. REv. 39 (1974).
11 A classic statement of this proposition is found in Llewellyn, What Price Con-
tract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 747-48 (1931).
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addition, since the writing required by the Statute need contain only
a statement of the contracting and the quantity term," the encour-
agement given to reduce all contract terms to writing comes only
incidentally, from the likelihood that more than the minimal terms
will be included in the writing.
On the other hand, the aim of the Code draftsmen to prevent the
use of the Statute as a device for reneging on an oral contract is
apparent from its background.4 1 It is likewise apparent in the written
memorandum provision of the Statute.42 Plaintiff can prevent defen-
dant's reneging by the production of a simple written memorandum
showing only the contracting and the quantity, even though the result
of this provision is to afford plaintiff the opportunity to falsely prove
terms of the contract other than the quantity term. In sum, the
Code's position is that the evil of allowing a defendant to use the
Statute to renege is greater than the danger of plaintiff's misleading
the court by false proof of terms not required in the written memoran-
dum.43 Applying this same Code policy in construing the admission
provision results in allowing the use of the involuntary admission in
the interest of preventing reneging, even at the expense of minimally
and incidentally discouraging the reduction of the entire contract to
writing.
These conclusions as to the purposes and policies of the sales
Statute of Frauds have found general support.4 4 If the Code admission
" The Statute of Frauds on investment securities also requires a statement of the
price term. See text accompanying note 31 supra. See also note 32 supra.
, See text accompanying notes 8-30, particularly at note 28 supra.
42 See note 31 supra.
43 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201, Comment 1 reads in part:
The required writing need not contain all the material terms of
the contract .... All that is required is that the writing afford a basis
for believing that the offered oral evidence rests on a real transaction
.... Thus if the price is not stated in the memorandum it can
normally be supplied without danger of fraud.
Professor Allan Farnsworth in his study of the pre-Code New York sales Statute
of Frauds noted:
There is a ... pressing question ... whether the evil to be prevented
[by the Statute] relates only to the false claim of an agreement when
in fact there was none, or whether an attempt should also be made to
minimize the danger of fraudulent misstatement of terms by one party
to an admitted agreement. The Code adheres to the former view in
requiring only a scant memorandum...
1960 REPORT OF [NEw YORK] LAW REVISION COMMISSION 260, Leg. Doc. (1960) No.
65(F) 16.
" The New York Law Revision Commission supported these conclusions in recom-
mending that the sales Statute of Frauds be amended so as to make an oral contract
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provision is ambiguous it should therefore be construed to include
involuntary admissions to promote such purposes and policies.
B. Drafting History of the Admission Provision
The 1952 version of the Code Statute of Frauds admission provi-
sion provided that an oral contract was enforceable "if the party
against whom enforcement [was] sought [admitted] in his pleading
or otherwise in court" that a contract was made; it did not include
the present additional language regarding an admission in "testi-
mony."45 Some authorities, including Professor William Hawkland,
commented that it was unclear whether this language applied to an
involuntary admission." Their reasoning presumably was that since
an admission in a pleading is voluntary, "pleading or otherwise in
court" could be read as meaning in a pleading or other voluntary
admission in court. This uncertainty was compounded by the fact
that the Official Comment to the provision spoke only of an admis-
sion by "pleading, by stipulation or by oral statement before the
court." In addition, the Comment made no mention of a change in
the law which had, pre-Code, almost invariably refused to allow an
involuntary admission to satisfy the Statute.47
enforceable by defendant's involuntary admission. See text accompanying notes 25 &
38 supra.
The RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS generally supports the use of the involuntary
admission. See text accompanying notes 88-91 infra.
Corbin, in his pre-Code treatise, while asserting that the Statute "renders some
service by operating in terrorem to cause contracts to be put in writing" and suggesting
that the Statute be retained for this purpose, urged that it be amended so as to be
available as a defense only to a defendant who denied under oath the making of the
contract. 2 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 275, at 13 (1950).
Professor Ronan Degnan, stating that the principal argument advanced in modem
justification of the Statute is that its very existence is an admonition that important
matters be put in writing, pointed out that "[tihis incentive would remain" under a
system which allows an involuntary admission to satisfy the Statute. Degnan, The
Evidence Law of Discovery: Exclusion Because of Fear of Perjury, 43 TEX. L. Rxv. 435,
450 (1965). See also authorities cited in note 38 supra.
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201(3)(b) (1952 version).
" W. HAWKLAND, SALES & BULK SALES 31 (1st ed. 1955), set out in note 53 infra.
See also the New York Law Revision Commission's comment in note 48 and accompa-
nying text infra.
"7 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201, Comment 7. The language of Comment 7
in the 1972 Official Text with Comments is the same as the original 1952 language of
the Comment; it was not revised when the statute was revised in 1957. The Code
Editorial Board's explanation of the statutory revision, set out in the text accompany-
ing note 49 infra, must however be read into the current Comment. See the New York
Law Revision Commission's reference to the language of Comment 7 in note 48 infra.
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The influential New York Law Revision Commission's study of
the 1952 Code draft noted "[a] question ... whether paragraph (b)
[of section 2-201(3)] applies to involuntary admissions-e.g., admis-
sions elicited by cross-examination."4 Section 2-201(3)(b) was re-
vised in the 1957 draft of the Code by adding "testimony or" after
"pleading." The Code Editorial Board gave this explanation for the
change, "Reason: Subsection (3)(b) was revised to meet the sugges-
tions of the New York Commission that its application to admissions
on cross-examination should be clarified."49
C. Commentaries on the Code Admission Provision
An occasional commentator has asserted flatly that an involun-
tary admission does not satisfy the Code sales Statute of Frauds. 0
As to pre-Code law on involuntary admissions, see text accompanying notes 15-22
supra.
1956 REPORT OF THE [NEW YORK] LAW REVISION COMMISSION 368, Leg. Doc.
(1956) No. 65(D) 36. The 1955 REPORT OF THE [NEW YORK] LAW REVISION COMMISSION
372, Leg. Doc. 65(C) 38 stated, "There may arise the question whether under this
language [of the 1952 version of § 2-201(3)(b)] the party seeking to enforce an oral
agreement may call the other party as a witness and force him to admit or deny the
making of the contract. The Comment does not indicate that such was intended, but
it is not clearly foreclosed by the language of the section."
"' The 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE 25 (1957) states, "In the 1957 version of the Code the 1952 version [of § 2-
201(3)(b)] was changed. . . to make it clear that it applied to admissions on cross-
examination." Farnsworth, Statute of Frauds Governing Contracts for the Sales of
Goods, 1960 REPORT OF THE [NEW YORK] LAW REVISION COMMISSION 257, 271 Leg. Doc.
(1960) No. 65(F) 13, 27 states, "The word 'testimony' was added ... to be certain that
statements made during cross-examination would qualify as admissions under this
section [2-201(3)(b)]." See Note, The Statute of Frauds Under Article 2 (Sales) of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 15 SYRACUSE L. REV. 532, 540 (1964). UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE § 8-319(d) was similarly revised in the 1957 Code revision. 6 BENDER'S
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERVICE § 8-319, at 1-613 (1968). This section is set out in
note 32 supra.
11 R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (2d ed. 1970) originally took this
position, but the position is qualified in the 1973 Supplement. See note 54 infra.
50 NEW YORK JURISPRUDENCE, Sales § 26, at 553 (1966) states, "It is unlikely that
a party can be forced to admit the contract in his testimony. Accordingly, a deposition
signed by a party under duress is not a sufficient memorandum or writing to take the
case out of the statute of frauds."
Mr. William Davenport, when chairman of the Subcommittee on Sales, Bulk
Sales and Documents of Title of the American Bar Association's Section on Corpora-
tion, Banking and Business Law, stated, "Although Official Comment 7 may not
clearly indicate, the admission referred to [in § 2-201(3)(b)] is a voluntary admission,
whether in testimony by deposition or in open court. The very inclusion of a statute of
frauds in the Code suggests the foregoing view of its character as a defense. An opposite
1976]
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More than a score of commentators5 have stated that it is uncertain
whether an involuntary admission satisfies the Statute.2 Included in
view would destroy it as a defense for the honest party." Annotation, 26 SMITH HURD
ILL. ANN. STATS. Ch. 26, § 2-201, at 112 (1963).
51 See notes 52-54 infra.
52 Professor (now Justice) Robert Braucher said of § 2-201(3)(b), "[Tihere seems
as yet to have been no clear ruling on the question whether the admission can be sought
by examination before trial." (Professor Braucher cites Stevens, Ethics and the Stat-
ute of Frauds, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 355 (1952), the New York Law Revision Commission
Report recommending that the 1952 Admission Provision be amended to make clear
its application to cross-examination, see text accompanying note 48 supra, and Smith
v. Muss, 203 Misc. 356, 117 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1952), app. den., 281 App. Div.
959) Braucher, Sale of Goods in the Uniform Commercial Code, 26 LA. L. REv. 192,
202 (1966). Perhaps the uncertainty expressed by Professor Braucher is limited to the
propriety of the use of the pretrial device, but since all three citations deal not with
that question but with the general one of the propriety of an involuntary admission,
the uncertainty seems to go to the latter question.
Professor Donald Clifford stated, "The draftsmen of the provision have given no
answer to the question [of the involuntary admission], and it appears to be in doubt."
Clifford, Article Two: Sales, 44 N.C.L. REv. 539, 555 (1966).
Mr. Richard Duesenberg, as chairman of the Subcommittee on General Provi-
sions, Sales, Bulk Transfers and Documents of Title of the American Bar Association's
Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law, remarked in discussing the 1974
Alabama Supreme Court case, Cox v. Cox, 292 Ala. 106, 289 So.2d 609 (1974), (which
he incorrectly attributes to the Arkansas Supreme Court), that there is "considerable
speculation" whether § 2-201(3)(b) applies to involuntry admissions. Duesenberg,
General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers and Title, 30 Bus. LAW. 847, 849 (1975).
Mr. Duesenberg also asserted that the Alabama court, which stated it was not pass-
ing on the involuntary admission question in that defendant had denied the contract
and the question was therefore not before it, did not "enthuasiastic[ly] embrace"
the involuntary admission doctrine. Id. However, he seems to base this assertion on
the ground that the defendant had voluntarily admitted the contract in his testi-
mony. He also indicated that Corn v. Cox was the first Supreme Court commentary
on involuntary admissions, but his treatise with Professor Laurence King, see note
56 infra, notes that the Iowa Supreme Court approved the use of an involuntary
admission in Quad County Grain, Inc. v. Poe, 202 N.W.2d 118 (Iowa 1972). See note
127 and accompanying text infra. The Georgia Supreme Court also approved the
involuntary admission doctrine in 1972 in Hale v. Higginbothom, 228 Ga. 823, 188
S.E.2d 515 (1972). See note 129 and accompanying text infra.
Professors Lon Fuller and Melvin Eisenberg in their casebook BASIC CONTRACr LAW
1003 (3d ed. 1972), say of § 2-201(3)(b):
The ambit of the provision is unclear, but its impact may be striking.
For example, under this section can a plaintiff bring suit on an oral
contract, file a notice of deposition, force the defendant to admit that
the oral contract was in fact made, and thereby use modem discovery
procedure to effectively blunt the thrust of the basic requirement of a
writing in a sale-of-goods case?
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this latter group are some of the most widely recognized authorities
in the field of commercial law. This position is also taken in most of
the current commercial law treatises, including those of Professor
William Hawkland.5 3 Anderson's Uniform Commercial Code" now
Professor William Hogan in his New York Annotation to § 2-201(3)(b) stated, "It
is unlikely that a party can be forced to admit the contract in his testimony." (Profes-
sor Hogan cites Smith v. Muss, 203 Misc. 356, 117 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1952), app.
den., 281 App. Div. 957, 122 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1953)). The Historical Note which follows
states, "Subsection (3)(b) was revised to meet suggestions of the Law Revision Com-
mission that its application to admissions on cross-examination be clarified ... " 62
1/2 McKINNEY'S CONSOL. LAWS OF N.Y. § 2-201, at 121 (1964).
Professor Richard Hudson stated, "Another question [with regard to § 2-
201(3)(b)] is. ..whether the opposite party may be compelled to admit on the trial,
or in other pre-trial procedures, that a contract was made. [Wlithout attempting to
thoroughly explore the subject, and with awareness of the futility of attempts to decide
what legislative intent was as to changing prior law, it is suggested that the general
thrust of the Iowa situation is to prohibit compelling a party to admit that a contract
was made." Hudson, Contracts in Iowa Revisited-1966, 15 DRAKE L. REv. 61, 77
(1966).
Professors Donald King, Calvin Kuenzel, T.E. Lauer, Neil Littlefield & Bradford
Stone in their CASES AND MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 3-31 to 33 (2d ed. 1974), pose the questions, "To what extent will a
party relying on an oral agreement be permitted to destroy thc statute of frauds by
compelling his adversary, through modem procedural devices, to admit the existence
of the oral agreement? What is the fate under the Code of a party who wishes to use
the statute of frauds to welch on a deal?" They find that, "Unfortunately, the language
of Section 2-201(3)(b) is not altogether clear or definitive as might be wished."
Professor Jerry Mashaw stated, "[T]he U.C.C. [§ 2-201] .. .may through its
exceptions now render unenforceable only the oral contracts of persons willing to risk
perjuring themselves." Marshaw, A Sketch of the Consequences for Louisiana Law of
the Adoption of "Article 2: Sales" of the Uniform Commercial Code, 42 TULANE L. REV.
740, (1968).
Professors Harry Pratter and Bruce Townsend have said of § 2-201(3)(b), "This
subsection does not make it clear whether a party can involuntarily be made to admit,
from the witness stand. ., the making of a contract." Annotation, 5 BURNS IND. STATS.
Pt. 2, at 34.
Note, An Anatomy of Sections 2-201 and 2-202 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(The Statute of Frauds and the Parol Evidence Rule), 4 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 381,
389 (1963) (It is a "point of conjecture," citing W. HAWKLAND, SALES & BULK SALES,
(1st ed. 1955); Cudahy, The Sales Contract-Formation, 49 MARQ. L. REV. 108, 110
(1965) ("It is an interesting question of policy"); Note, The Uniform Commercial Code:
Article 2-Sales, 29 ALBANY L. REv. 231, 241 (1965) (It is an "unresolved" problem,
citing Hawkland, the New York Law Revision Commission's recommendation on revis-
ing the 1952 admission provision, and Stevens, Ethics and the Statute of Frauds, 37
CORNELL L.Q. 355 (1952).
0 Professor William Hawkland, in the First Edition of his SALES & BULK SALES
(1955), after quoting UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201(3)(b) (1952 version), says:
There is no such provision in the Uniform Sales Act, but a num-
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her of courts have held that a party cannot admit the contract in court
and treat the Statute of Frauds as a defense. A more difficult problem,
which seldom has been adjudicated, is whether or not the plaintiff,
over proper evidentiary objection, can compel the defendant on the
stand to admit the fact that an oral contract was made. It would seem
that the defendant should be privileged not to make the admission if
it has the legal effect of depriving him of the defense of the Statute of
Frauds, but this is a matter upon which lawyers and judges are not
in agreement, and a plaintiff would be well advised to try to compel
the admission. Subsection 2-201(3)(b) has no specific answer to the
question.
Id. at 31. The Second Edition of this work in 1958, after quoting the 1957 revision of §
2-201(3)(b), repeats the First Edition comment set out above verbatim. Id. at 31.
Professor Hawkland's TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
(1964), says of § 2-201(3)(b), "This provision is novel, but a few courts operating under
the U.S.A. have held that a party cannot admit the contract in court and treat the
Statute of Frauds as a defense . . ." Id. at 29. He then discusses the question of a
demurrer as an admission, after which he states:
A more difficult question is whether or not the plaintiff, over proper
evidentiary objection, can compel the defendant on the stand to admit
that an oral contract was made. Subsection 2-201(3)(b) does not an-
swer this question, and it will have to be resolved on policy grounds.
In this connection, it may be urged, on the one hand, that the defen-
dant should not be required to make the admission, because any
waiver of the Statute of Frauds should be exercised voluntarily and
not under the threat of perjury. On the other hand, it may be con-
tended that the Statute of Frauds is not designed to protect the
welsher. If the defendant made the contract, why should it not be
enforceable? If he did not make it, he can deny it and set up the
Statute of Frauds. It is only the welsher, therefore, that faces the
problem of the "compelled admission," and the law should have little
solicitude for him. Since judges are not in general agreement as to how
this matter should be handled, the plaintiff would be well advised to
try to compel the admission.
Id. at 30.
The identity of the "judges" who disagree on the question of involuntary
admission ["which seldom has been adjudicated") is confusing, no cases being cited,
but reading the 1955, 1958 and 1964 comments together and recognizing that no Code
decision on the question or an involuntary admission was handed down until 1966, the
adjudications referred to must all be pre-Code. The impropriety of using pre-Code
decisions which refuse to allow an involuntary admission to satisfy the Statute as
authority under the new Code admission provision is discussed in the text accompany-
ing notes 58-59 infra.
The effect of Professor Hawkland's failure in his Second Edition to notice that §
2-201(3)(b) had been revised in 1957 to make clear that it applies to involuntary
admissions is discussed in the text accompanying notes 64-67 infra. His argument that
a defendant should not be deprived of his right to the Statute of Frauds defense by an
involuntary admission is discussed in the text accompanying note 59 infra.
Professor Hawkland's SUM AND SUBSTANCE OF LAW ON SALES (1974) has this to say:
UCC 2-201(3)(b) does not specifically indicate whether a plain-
tiff, over proper evidentiary objection, can compel the defendant to
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admit the fact that an oral contract was made, and thus, in effect,
deprive him of the defense of the Statute of Frauds. Nor does UCC 2-
201(3)(b) define the phrase "otherwise in court." As a result, it may
be argued that the satisfying admission can be made in any proceed-
ing proximately related to the trial, such as pre-trial discovery pro-
ceedings, etc.
Under this theory, it is proper to ask the defendant through depo-
sition or interrogatory whether or not he made the oral contract. He
should be required to answer the question. The reason why courts
should require a defendant to state whether or not he made an oral
contract with the plaintiff is that the Statute of Frauds is not designed
to shield the welsher.
In addition, Richard Duesenberg and Lawrence King, in 3 BENDER'S UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE SERVICE § 204(3) (1968), state:
The Code does not speak to the issue of an enforced or compulsory
answer, and it is conceiveable that jurisdictions will vary on their
attitudes as to whether an involuntary response .. .is within the
scope of Subsection (3)(b). One attitude is that presumably the an-
swer is truthful, and if it admits the existence of the contract, the
statutes should no longer be available in bar of the action. The volun-
tariness of the answer is viewed to be wholly irrelevant. Indeed, the
logic of this attitude could extend to refusing to dismiss on motion of
a defendant prior to completion of discovery proceedings, since in
those proceedings an admission of the contract might be made. On the
other hand, since the Code retains the statute of frauds, a party ought
to have the right to assert it, and this right should not be subject to
surrender by discovery rules which compel involuntary responses.
Which of these views will prevail remains for future cases to deter-
mine. (Footnotes omitted.)
Duesenberg and King cite no authority opposed to the use of an involuntary
admission. In support of the involuntary admission doctrine they cite (1) Garrison v.
Piatt, 113 Ga. App. 94, 147 S.E.2d 374 (1966), and (2) Reissman Int'l Corp. v. J.S.O.
Wood Prods., 10 UCC REP. SERV. 1165 (N.Y. Civ. 1972), both of which held § 2-
201(3)(b) barred dismissal of a complaint based on an oral contract, saying that the
court in the former case makes "a strong suggestion" and tha that the court in the
latter "added" that compelled testimony can be used to satisfy the Statute, (3) Cohn
v. Fisher, 118 N.J. Super. 286, 287 A.2d 222 (1972), as strongly suggested that an
involuntary admission satisfies the Statute, and (4) Quad County Grain, Inc. v. Poe,
202 N.W.2d 118 (Iowa 1972), holding that an admission in testimony, both on direct
and cross-examination, is sufficient to satisfy the Statute.
The validity of the above argument opposed to involuntary admission is examined
in the text accompanying note 57 infra.
Professors John Calamari and Joseph Perillo in CONTRACTS 471 (1970) assert that,
"The principal question the Code provision [§ 2-201(3)(b)] raises is whether and to
what extent the party against whom enforcement is sought can be compelled to admit
the existence of the oral contract either during the trial or in pre-trial proceedings."
They give no response to the question other than citing Duesenberg and King's predic-
tion that courts will divide on the question. But see Professor Perillo's conclusion in
1974 that a party can be compelled to admit the existence of the contract, in text
accompanying note 73 and in note 79 infra.
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takes this position although originally it had stated flatly that an
involuntary admission did not satisfy the Statute.55
In view of the policies and purposes, plain language, and drafting
Finally, Professor Alphonse Squillante and Professor John Fonesca in 2 S. WILLI-
SON, SALES § 14-9, at 304-5 (4th ed. 1974) say:
What of the question of an admission by the party against whom
enforcement is sought concerning the oral agreement; made while he
is giving the testimony on the stand in open court? Whether or not
the party against whom enforcement is sought can be compelled, over
proper objection, to admit the existence of an oral contract is not
easily answered. . . . The Code does not provide any specific answers
to the questions posed above. It does not define any of the phrases
which it gives in § 2-201(3)(b). It would be equally forceful to argue
that one may satisfy § 2-201(1) by the alternate methods provided in
§ 2-201(3)(b).
The appended "Practice Pointer" states:
If you represent defendant, the arguments should be made that if the
defendant can be compelled to admit the existence of the contract, he
should be able to use the statute as a defense and that only formal
judicial admissions are contemplated by Sec. 2-201(3)(b) . . . . The
plaintiff's representative would, on the other hand, seek to broaden
the impact of this section by claiming it related to such things as pre-
trial conferences, discovery proceedings, and so on. There is no Code
law on any of these matters and pre-Code law favors the plaintiff.
They cite no authority directed to the question of the propriety of satisfying the Statute
of Frauds by an involuntary admission, although Garrison v. Piatt, 113 Ga. App. 94,
147 S.E.2d 374 (1966), is cited in connection with the question whether a demurrer is
an admission. Cohn v. Fisher, 118 N.J. Super. 286, 287 A.2d 222 (1972), is cited in
connection with the use of an admission by deposition, and In re Particle Reduction
Corp., is cited to illustrate that a casually stated admission can satisfy the Statute.
Professor Squillante similarly stated, "This problem has in no way been answered
by either the comments to the Code or through litigation." Squillante, Sales Law in
Iowa Under the Uniform Commercial Code-Article 2, 20 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 64 (1970),
citing Hudson, Contracts in Iowa Revisited-1966, 15 DRAKE L. REV. 61 (1966).
51 1.R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 281 (2d ed. 1970) states, "A judicial
admission does not exist unless the statement is voluntarily made. Hence the answer
of a defendant when examined under oath as to whether there was a contract is not to
be regarded as an admission for the purpose of the statute of frauds." The only author-
ity cited is Hawkland, who, as a New York court has pointed out, does not support
this proposition. Reissman International Corp. v. J.S.O. Wood Products, Inc., 10 UCC
REP. SERV. 1165 (N.Y. Civ. 1972). The 1973 Supplement to Anderson states, "An oral
contract is enforceable when there has been an admission of the existence of the
contract in pre-trial discovery and the admission is confirmed by the existence of a
deposit check given by the buyer. There is conflict of authority, however, as to whether
the admission of a contract in a deposition removes the bar of the statute of frauds,
the negative view being based on the consideration that the admission was not volun-
tary."
I See notes 50-54 supra.
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history of the Code admission provision discussed above, why have
so many eminent commentators expressed doubt that it applies to
involuntary admissions? The chief argument, as stated by its original
proponent Professor William Hawkland, is as follows: "[I]t may be
urged, on the one hand, that the defendant should not be required to
make the admission, because any waiver of the Statute of Frauds
should be exercised voluntarily and not under the threat of perjury,"
and "the defendant should be privileged not to make the admission
if it has the legal effect of depriving him of the defense of the Statute
of Frauds."56 Professor Hawkland, and the other commentators who
make this argument, however, support their contentions only with
pre-Code cases and one another as authority.
This argument is specious. The simple error is that under the
Code Statute of Frauds a party has no right or privilege to renege on
an oral contract in this situation, and thus he is not being forced to
give up any right or privilege; for this is a situation where the Statute
of Frauds provides that the oral contract is enforceable, and hence
there is no right to renege, because the party against whom enforce-
ment is sought testifies in court to its existence. The only possible
source of a right to renege on an otherwise valid and enforceable oral
contract is the Statute of Frauds itself, which gives the right only if
a writing, a receipt and acceptance, payment, and an admission are
all absent.57 Here the last of these alternatives is present and the
Statute therefore gives no right to renege.
Furthermore there is here no improper duress. Defendant is only
asked to speak the truth. He is subjected only to the normal process
of interrogation by an adversary; and his admission, rather than
being considered ineffective, should be accorded the high degree of
probity usually given to statements against interest.
This argument did have force under pre-Code law, when the Stat-
ute of Frauds contained no admission provision. Thus in the pre-Code
case of Smith v. Muss,5" a New York court held that an oral contract
"4 W. HAWKLAND, SALES & BULK SALES 31 (1st ed. 1955).
In addition, Professor Lawrence King and his coauthor say, "On the [one] hand
[it may be argued], since the Code retains the Statute of Frauds, a party ought to
have the right to assert it, and his right should uot be subject to surrender by discovery
rules which compel involuntary responses." 3 BENDER'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
SaVIcE, SALES & BULK TRANSFERS, § 204(3). Mr. Ronald Anderson has said, "A judicial
admission does not exist unless the statement is voluntarily made." 1 R. ANDERSON,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 281 (2d ed. 1970).
s See text accompanying notes 31, 32 supra.
203 Misc. 356, 117 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1952), app. den., 281 App. Div. 957,
122 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1953). See note 17 supra.
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was unenforceable, even though the defendant had admitted it in a
signed deposition, because he "did so under compulsion of legal pro-
cess."59 There was validity to this reasoning because the pre-Code
Statute contained no admission provision. In addition, pre-Code
courts interpreted the Statute strictly, refusing to allow an involun-
tary admission to make the contract enforceable; and a defendant
therefore had the right to renege by asserting the Statute. Thus, pre-
Code, to have allowed a party's involuntary admission to satisfy the
Statute would have taken this right from under compulsion of legal
process. Those who continue to make this argument under present
law and who continue to cite Smith v. Muss and similar pre-Code
cases as current authority overlook the critical change wrought by the
addition of the admission provision to the Statute of Frauds.
Sometimes coupled with the argument that a party cannot be
compelled to give up the right to the Statute of Frauds defense by
an involuntary admission is the argument that the Code admission
provision is unclear and ambiguous." For instance, Professor Donald
King and his coauthors state, "The language of Section 2-201(3)(b)
is not altogether as clear or definitive as might be wished" on the
question of the compelled admission, and therefore its answer "boils
down to whether a court wants to constrict the applicability of the
statute of frauds as a defense, or whether it wishes to give the statute
a broad play."'" Professor Hawkland says, "Subsection 2-201(3)(b)
does not answer this question, and it will have to be resolved on policy
grounds.""2 These commentators and others who have the same diffi-
culty with the language of the admission provision do not explain why
they believe it may be necessary to read "admit in his . . . testimony
...in court" to mean in his voluntary testimony only, rather than
to give the language its ordinary meaning. They do not analyze the
language or explain what word or part of the provision they find
unclear. None of these commentators explains why he believes that
the Code Editorial Board may have failed in its avowed purpose of
revising the provision to make clear its application to admissions on
cross-examinations. Indeed, perhaps significantly, none of these com-
5' 203 Misc. at 358, 117 N.Y.S.2d at 503.
" Professor Lawrence King and his coauthor say, "The Code does not speak to
the issue of an enforced or compulsory answer, and it is conceivable that jurisdictions
will vary in their attitudes as to whether an involuntary response . . . is within the
scope of Subsection (3)(b)." 3 BENDER'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERVICE, SALES &
BULK TRANSFERS, § 204 (1974).
, See note 52 supra.
62 W. HAWKLAND, SALES & BULK SALES (Ist ed. 1955).
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mentators mentions the revision or the Board's purpose in making
it. 63
The above arguments are unconvincing and puzzling. The solu-
tion to the puzzle may be Professor Hawkland's position of doubt as
to the Code admission provision's application to involuntary admis-
sions. This position was originally taken in the 1955 (First) Edition
of his Sales and Bulk Sales, which was based on the then-current 1952
draft of the Code.64 As related above, because of his and other criti-
cism that the 1952 draft version of the admission provision was am-
biguous as to its application to involuntary admissions, the Code
Editorial Board revised the provision in its final 1957 Code Revision
to make clear that it does apply to involuntary admissions.65 Never-
theless, Professor Hawkland in the 1958 (Second) Edition of his Sales
and Bulk Sales, although setting out the revised provision, repeated
verbatim his criticism of the 1952 provision without any mention of
the revision. 6 Either Professor Hawkland concluded that the Edi-
torial Board had been unsuccessful in its effort to answer his criticism
and that its effort was so clearly unsuccessful that it was unnecessary
to explain why he found it so, or he overlooked the change. The latter
explanation of Professor Hawkland's failure to deal with the revision
is the more reasonable, and therefore his statement of doubt as to the
availability of involuntary admissions to satisfy the Statute of Frauds
should be considered applicable to the 1952 version of the admission
provision only. Professor Hawkland was the first commentator to
doubt.the application of the admission provision to involuntary ad-
missions, and for a number of years his was the only treatise dealing
with the matter. A number of the later commentators who express the
same doubt and who seemingly also fail to recognize the significance
of the revision of the admission provision cite Professor Hawkland as
authority; others were undoubtedly influenced by his position." Thus
the foregoing arguments against the use of involuntary admissions to
satisfy the Statute of Frauds are without substance and, indeed, their
very existence is probably attributable to an oversight.
Another argument against the use of involuntary admissions is
'3 Professor Hogan does call attention to the revision and the Board's purpose, but
his basis for doubting that the Code admission provision permits an involuntary ad-
mission to satisfy the Statute of Frauds is pre-Code decisional law, not ambiguity of
the language of the provision.
61 W. HAWKLAND, SALES & BuLK SALES (1st ed. 1955). See note 53 supra.
See text accompanying notes 45-49 supra.
6 W. HAWKLAND, SALES & BULK SALES (2d ed. 1958). See note 53 supra.
" See note 53 supra.
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made by Mr. William Davenport, who states, "The very inclusion of
the Statute of Frauds in the Code suggests the ... view [that only
voluntary admissions satisfy the Statute]. An opposite view would
destroy it as a defense for the honest party."68 This argument is falla-
cious. Involuntary admission procedure by no means destroys the
Statute of Frauds defense; for in the situation where it is most
needed, that is, where plaintiff seeks to testify falsely to the existence
of an oral contract or to the quantity therein, and where defendant
will therefore deny these matters, the defense is still fully available
to bar plaintiffs claim.
Another commentator reveals a misconception which may be the
basis of the argument that involuntary admissions destroy the Stat-
ute of Frauds." He apparently assumes that upon a defendant's de-
nial of the existence of an oral contract on plaintiffs interrogation,
plaintiff would then be entitled to introduce proof of the oral contract
(and so possibly perjured proof) to disprove the denial. He further
assumes that in that case, a finding by the court that defendant's
denial was false would constitute an admission by defendant and
thus satisfy the Statute. Plaintiff could thus recover on the basis of
his perjured testimony, and the Statute of Frauds would indeed be
destroyed. The Code admission provision cannot be so read, however.
The disproval by plaintiff of defendant's denial is not an admission
by defendant. 0 Only when the defendant actually admits the oral
"Annotation, 26 SMITH HURD ILL. ANN. STATS. Ch. 26, § 2-212 (1963). See note
50 supra.
Other commentators, in suggesting that since the Code retains the Statute of
Frauds an involuntary admission should not satisfy the Statute, may have this same
reasoning in mind. E.q., Duesenberg and King, 3 BENDER'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
SERVICE, SALES & BuLK TRANSFERS, § 204(3) (1974).
Refusing to enforce an oral contract which had been admitted by defendant in his
deposition on the ground that the admission was involuntary, a New York court in the
pre-Code case Smith v. Muss said, "If the compulsory signing of the deposition is to
be regarded as thereby [satisfying the Statute], this device, so employed, if recog-
nized, would render the defense of the Statute of Frauds impotent." 203 Misc. 356,
358, 117 N.Y.S.2d 501, 503 (Sup. Ct. 1952). See note 17 supra. One commentator
criticizes this reasoning saying, "a decision contrary to that in the Smith case would
further the purpose of the Statute rather than render it ineffective." 38 CORNELL L.Q.
604, 606 (1953).
11 6 AMERICAN Bus. L.J. 602 (1968), criticizing Garrison v. Piatt, 113 Ga. App. 94,
147 S.E.2d 314 (1966).
"' Cox v. Cox, 292 Ala. 103, 289 So.2d 609 (1974). This case held that where the
party against whom enforcement of an oral contract was sought denied the contract
in court, a "credibility determination" adverse to the party made by the trial court
did not constitute an admission. See also 23 N.Y.S.B. Bull. 116, 118 (1951) ("[lit
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contract does the admission provision come into operation.
It is true that involuntary admission procedure does destroy the
Statute of Frauds defense for the defendant who honestly admits to
making a contract and to the quantity agreed upon, but would like
to use the Statute to bar plaintiff's claim because he is at variance
with plaintiff as to other terms of the contract. The Code's position
is that the danger of plaintiff's falsely proving such additional terms
is not great, and that the advantage obtained by allowing defendant's
minimal statements to satisfy the Statute is greater than the danger
of plaintiff's falsely proving the additional terms."
If the Code admission provision is ambiguous, the courts must
answer the question whether it encompasses involuntary admissions.
The decisions of the half-dozen courts which have addressed them-
selves to the question unanimously support the use of involuntary
admissions. These decisions came after most of the above commenta-
tors' statements, many of these statements having been made in
surveys published at the time of the adoption of the Code. Whether
the judicial authority has settled the uncertainty of these early com-
mentators is not known. However, five of these statements were made
after 1972, when the line of cases had developed.72 Of these five,
Professor Joseph Perillo, who in 1970 indicated that the question was
unanswered, by 1974 had concluded that an involuntary admission
could be used to satisfy the Statute. This change was apparently
based on the intervening decisions.73 Mr. Ronald Anderson was also
forced by the case law to qualify his original position that the admis-
sion provision forbids the use of an involuntary admission.74 Professor
Lawrence King and his coauthor, although stating that certain Code
cases strongly support the involuntary admission doctrine, persist in
would seem that a perjurer who refused to admit the making of an oral contract would
have a defense. .. .")
3 BENDER'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERVICE, SALES & BULK SALES § 2.04 [3],
at 2-80 n.33.3 (1975 Supp.) states:
"A denial is not an admission. It sets up a controversy which it is the
very purpose of the statute to prevent. To permit the trier of facts to
judge the credibility of the denial would be to flaunt the directive of
the statute. A judicial recognition of this is expressed in Cox v. Cox."
71 See text accompanying notes 39-44 and note 43 supra.
72 The cases are set out in the text accompanying notes 121-139 infra. One case
was decided in 1966, one in 1968 and four in 1972. An additional case, decided in 1974,
is set out in the text accompanying note 118 infra.
13 See note 79 infra.
11 See note 54 supra.
19761
24 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIII
their earlier position that an answer to the question "remains for
future cases to determine." 5
More than a dozen commentators," however, support the proposi-
tion that the Code admission provision does permit an involuntary
admission to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Included among these
commentators are the editors of the latest editions of several texts on
sales7 7 and on the Uniform Commercial Code78 and other widely rec-
ognized authorities. Some of these commentators have expressly
taken this position," while others have implicitly recognized it in
stating that the Code admission provision was revised to make clear
that it applies to admissions on cross examination," or in discussing
See note 53 supra.
" See notes 77-85 infra.
Professor Robert Nordstrom in SALES 69 (Hornbook Series 1970) says, "[O]ral
admissions in court will likewise assure the trier of facts that some contract has been
entered into by the parties. Thus, section 2-201(3)(b) provides that any admission in
court will suffice to satisfy the statute of frauds ... ." (emphasis added), citing In re
Particle Reduction Corp., 5 UCC REP. SERV. 242 (1968), which held that an involuntary
admission satisfies the Statute.
1' Professors James White and Robert Summers in UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 57
(1972), say § 2-201(3)(b) "contemplates the possibility that an oral contract within the
statute may become enforceable by virtue of an admission in 'open court' on cross-
examination. One recent New York lower court case and a Georgia case support this
interpretation." These professors, along with Professor Richard Speidel, also discuss §
2-201(3)(b) in their TEACHING MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW 753-54 (2d
ed. 1974), saying of it:
The underlying policy has been succinctly stated by the late Dean
Stevens of Cornell: '[The Statute] should not be recognized as a
defense except where the defendant can and does deny the contract-
ing.' Should the defendant be privileged not to make an admission
which would deprive him of a defense? It has been held that admis-
sions compelled under oath are sufficient to satisfy the statute of
frauds.
7' Dean Robert Foster says of § 2-201(3)(b), "Presumably, a party may institute
suit on an oral contract and force an admission of the contract under oath from the
party sought to be bound." Reporter's Comments, 2A CODE OF LAWS OF S.C. § 10.2-
201 at 61 (1966).
Professor Joseph Perillo says, "Under the suggestion made here. . . the defendant
...could be called upon to deny or admit under oath that the contract was made
... . Such a rule exists under the Uniform Commercial Code [§ 2-201(3)(b)]."
Perillo, The Statute of Frauds in the Light of Functions and Disfunctions of Form, 43
FORDHAM L. REV. 39, 70 (1974).
10 Professor Allan Farnsworth so states, 1960 REPORT OF THE [NEW YORK] LAW
REvISION COMMISSION 257, 271 Leg. Doc. (1960) No. 65(F) 13, 27.
Professor William Hogan in his New York Annotations to § 2-201(3)(b) states that
the section was revised to make clear that it applies to admissions on cross-
examination, but the annotation also states that it is unlikely that a party can be
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a defendant's possibly perjured denial under the provision,' or in
noting that the purpose of the provision is to prevent welshing.2
Rarely have these commentators noted any doubt as to the proposi-
tion, and hence they have rarely discussed it. 3 The only strident
voices raised in protest against the doctrine of doubt are those of two
law student commentators: one student dismissed the doubt as "ri-
diculous,"' " and the second demanded, "Why shouldn't the defen-
dant be compellable? [I]f there was a contract, he should have to
admit it." The most cogent arguments in support of involuntary
admissions can be found in the comments of those who are uncertain
about the use of such admissions. For instance, Professor Lawrence
King and his coauthor say, "One attitude is that presumably the
answer is truthful, and if it admits the existence of the contract, the
statute should no longer be available in bar of the action. The volun-
tariness of the answer is viewea as wholly irrelevant."" Professor
Hawkland, after setting out his argument against involuntary admis-
sions, says:
compelled to admit the contract. 62 1/ McKINNEY'S CONSOL. LAWS OF N.Y. § 2-201, at
121 (1964).
Professors Warren Shattuck and Richard Cosway, Mrs. Marjorie Rombauer and
Mrs. Beverly Roseman, so state. Comments, REv. CODE OF WASH. ANN. Title 62A, § 2-
201(3)(b), at 125 (1966).
"1 Professor Walter Jaeger remarks, "It has been suggested that given the fallibil-
ity of human memory: Does the aforequoted section [2-201(3)(b)] of the UCC encour-
age or discourage denial under oath of the making of an oral contract?" 3 S. WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 527, at 711 n.6 (3d ed. 1970).
Professor Norman Lattin questions the soundness of California's refusal to enact
§ 2-201(3)(b) (see text accompanying note 99 infra), asking, "Is is not equally immoral
to permit one to escape an honest contract which honest men would likely admit in
pleading or on the witness stand, if called by plaintiff?." Lattin, Uniform Commercial
Code, Article 2 on Sales: Some Observations on Four Fundamentals, 16 HASTINGS L.J.
551, 571 (1965).
Professor Ian MacNeil states, "[Ulnder the UCC, an honest man or one unwilling
to perjure himself may be bound to a noncomplying oral agreement entered into hast-
ily, because he will admit its existence when called as a witness in the action brought
to enforce the agreement. . . ." CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 1318-19 (1971).
Spies, Sales: Article II, 16 ARK. L. REV. 6, 10 (1961); McKinney, Personal Property
and Sales, 19 MERCER L. REV. 154, 155 (1968); 23 N.Y.S.B. BULL. 116, 118 (1951).
0 Professor Lawrence Vold so states, SALES 88 (2d ed. Hornbook Series 1959).
" But see discussions of Professors Speidel, Summers and White referred to in
note 78 supra.
" Comment, Changes Wrought in the Statute of Frauds by the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 48 MARQ. L. REV. 571, 582 (1965).
" Note, Uniform Commercial Code: Statute of Frauds as to Personal Property, 4
WAKE FOREST INTRAMURAL L. REV., 41, 72 n.101 (1968).
11 See note 53 supra.
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On the other hand, it may be contended that the Statute of
Frauds is not designed to protect the welsher. If the defendant
made the contract, why should it not be enforceable? If he did
not make it, he can deny it and set up the Statute of Frauds.
It is only the welsher, therefore, that faces the problem of the
"compelled admission," and the law should have little solici-
tude for him.8"
D. Restatement of Contracts
Although the Restatement of Contracts does not cover contracts
for the sale of goods or investment securities, leaving these matters
to Uniform Commercial Code coverage, Comment d to Section 209
of the Restatement dealing with the Statute of Frauds is of interest."
The Comment says that a written deposition may satisfy the Statute
and that where the deposition "is made under legal compulsion, it is
nonetheless effective unless there is a contrary procedural policy in
the state."89 Non-Code oral contracts would, under the Restatement,
generally be enforceable by involuntary admissions. The special
"procedural policies," although perhaps precluding use of involun-
tary admissions to enforce non-Code oral contracts in certain situa-
tions"0 would not seem to apply to Code sales contracts.
" W. HAWKLAND, SALES & BULK SALES (1st ed. 1955).
's RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973), reads,
"Except in the case of a writing evidencing a contract upon consideration of marriage,
the Statute may be satisfied by a signed writing not made as a memorandum of a
contract." Comment a., Rationale reads, "The rule of this Section reflects the general
assumption that the primary purpose of the Statute is evidentiary, that it was not
intended to facilitate repudiation of oral contracts. The marriage provision, however,
performs a cautionary function as well . . . ." Id.
11 Comment d to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209 (Tent. Drafts Nos.
1-7, 1973). The Comment also says that, "An oral statement before the court is treated
in some states as the equivalent of a signed writing. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§§ 2-201(3)(b), 8-319(d)" and that where such oral statement "is made under legal
compulsion, it is nonetheless effective unless there is a contrary procedural policy in
the state." Id.
11 Comment d does not say what these contrary procedural policies might be, but
the accompanying Reporter's Note cites these pre-Code cases holding that the admis-
sion was ineffective because involuntary: Smith v. Muss, 203 Misc. 356, 117 N.Y.S.2d
501 (Sup. Ct. 1952), app. den., 281 App. Div. 957, 122 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1953) (See text
accompanying notes 17, 58-59, and 68 supra); Davis v. Stambaugh, 163 Ill. 557, 45 N.E.
170 (1896); Cash v. Clark, 61 Mo. App. 636 (1895) (See text accompanying note 16
supra). Two reasons were given in these decisions: First, that defendant should not be
compelled by the contempt power of the court to surrender the right to renege on an
oral contract by pleading the Statute of Frauds given him by the pre-Code sales law.
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E. Other Possible Bases of Opposition to Involuntary Admissions
The following matters in connection with the use of involuntary
admissions, although not mentioned by the commentators who doubt
that such admissions satisfy the Statute of Frauds, may help explain
the widespread reluctance to approve their use.
Contracts within the sales Statute of Frauds are not void, but are
unenforceable unless there is the requisite written memorandum,
performance by receipt and acceptance or by payment, or
admission." However, it seems that in certain quarters, oral sales
contracts, even though by their terms binding, are considered by the
parties to be unenforceable until reduced to writing or performed.
One empirical study made prior to the adoption of the Code found
that, "The majority of businessmen [surveyed] does not believe that
this class of promises [promisees in oral sales contracts] should have
legal rights, especially when the potential plaintiff has not performed
in reliance upon the oral promise . . . .And if the parties do want
the law to supervise their transactions, it seems fair to assume that
they will reduce their respective commitments to writing."" If this
finding is correct, such business parties may well have difficulty in
accepting the proposition that the Code admission provision produces
a result contrary to their understanding whenever either party
chooses to utilize its involuntary admission procedure. Where such
parties desire that their oral promises be non-binding until reduced
to writing or some performance is made in reliance on them, their
oral arrangements should clearly so state. 3
As Professor Ronan Degan has pointed out, the pre-Code judicial
attitude against allowing coerced admissions to satisfy the Statute of
Frauds was a manifestation of the then-prevailing view in the law of
discovery that one party could not compel the other to help prove his
In non-Code contract situations today, where the applicable Statutes of Frauds do not
contain admission provisions, such policy may still be controlling; but in Code sales
contracts it has no pertinence as the Code admission provision has eliminated the right
to renege. See text accompanying notes 57-59 supra. Second, it was asserted that the
temptation to commit perjury afforded by involuntary admission procedure should
preclude its use. This reasoning has been rejected in all Code states except California.
See text accompanying notes 97-108 infra.
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201, Comment 4 states, "Failure to satisfy the
requirements of this section does not render the contract void for all purposes, but
merely prevents it from being judicially enforced in favor of a party to the contract."
12 Note, The Statute of Frauds in the Business Community: A Re-appraisal in the
Light of Prevailing Business Practices, 66 YALE L.J. 1038, 1065 (1957).
3 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-205.
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case.94 As Professor Degan emphasizes, however, a revolution has
occurred in this attitude with the development of modem discovery,
and no longer may one refuse to give answers because the answers will
aid the questioner in establishing his claim.9" Properly viewed, the
Code admission provision is a part of this reversal in attitude. Per-
haps some of those who are reluctant to recognize the application of
the admission provision to involuntary admissions are influenced by
the outmoded philosophy of the law of discovery.
The anomaly of a successful suit on a contract which was unen-
forceable when the suit was brought may be the source of some uncer-
tainty as to the propriety of using the involuntary admission. The
Code lawmakers, though, have seen no impropriety in allowing an
event which occurs during the suit to make the oral contract enforcea-
ble. There is no doubt that a defendant's voluntary admission during
the suit satisfies the Statute; there should be no objection to the fact
that an involuntary admission satisfying the Statute comes after the
suit is brought.
Possible procedural problems must be met in order to prevent
dismissal of the suit before the admission is extracted, but modem
procedure is sufficiently flexible to implement this new Code right to
enforce an oral contract by an involuntary admission."
Dean Robert Stevens demonstrated that the original reason given
by the courts for refusing to allow a sworn admission of an oral con-
tract to satisfy the Statute of Frauds was the fear of encouraging
defendant to perjuriously deny the oral contract,97 and this reasoning
11 Degnan, The Evidence Law of Discovery: Exclusion of Evidence Because of Fear
of Perjury, 43 TEx. L. REV. 435, 448 (1965).
Corbin, speaking of pre-Code decisions which held that a compelled admission did
not satipfy the Statute of Frauds, remarked, "Perhaps this is on the theory that a party
should not be compelled to give evidence against himself, even in a civil action; but
the doctrine should not be carried so far." 2 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 519, at 758 (1950).
11 Degnan, The Evidence Law of Discovery: Exclusion of Evidence Because of Fear
of Perjury, 43 TEx. L. REV. 435, 448, 450 (1965); 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2001, at 13-20 (1970); 4 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.02,
at 26-61 to 26-64 (2d ed. 1953).
11 Procedure is available in modem civil procedure codes to prevent dismissal of
the suit by defendant before plaintiff has the opportunity of attempting to extract an
admission from defendant. E.g., N.Y.R. CIV. PRAC. § 3211(c) (motion to dismiss) and
§ 3212(f) (summary judgment). See Garrison v. Piatt, 113 Ga. App. 94, 147 S.E.2d 374
(1966), discussed in text accompanying note 128 infra; Reissman International Corp.
v. J.S.O. Wood Products, Inc., 10 UCC REP. SERV. 1165 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972), discussed
in text accompanying note 130 infra.
11 Stevens, Ethics and the Statute of Frauds, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 355, 371 (1952). See
also Degnan, The Evidence Law of Discovery: Exclusion of Evidence Because of Fear
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was used by a number of later pre-Code courts.98 California refused
to enact the Code admission provision in part because "the provisions
would reward a defendant's perjured denial." 9 This position is based
on the reasoning that the special temptation' 0 to commit perjury
provided by the involuntary admission procedure is a greater evil
than the welshing which is allowed in the absence of the involuntary
admission procedure.'0' Dean Stevens found this conclusion "aston-
ishing"'' 0 and it has been criticized by many other commentators 3
and courts"4 such as, for example the Maryland court in Trossbach
v. Trossbach.05 That court declared "the purpose of the Statute of
Frauds is to protect a party, not from temptation to commit perjury,
but from perjured evidence against him."'0 8 The Uniform Commer-
cial Code's Permanent Editorial Board rejected this objection to the
involuntary admission, saying of the California action, "[tihis issue
of policy has been fully debated many times . . . [The Board] con-
siders the arguments advanced against this provision in California
not persuasive."''07 This position has also been taken by the legisla-
tures of all Code states other than California by their adoption of the
admission provision. 08
of Perjury, 43 TEx. L. REv. 435, 444 (1965).
98 See, e.g., Thompson v. Jamesson, Fed. Cas. No. 13, 960, 1 Cranch C.C. 295
282], (C.C.D.C. 1806); Huffine v. McCampbell, 149 Tenn. 47, 257 S.W. 80 (1923).
" 23A ANN. CALIF. CODES § 2201, at 131 (1964).
' The reward of the perjurer comes more easily here than in ordinary perjury
where the success of the perjurer depends on his convincing the court of the truth of
his perjured testimony. Here the denial of the oral contract ipso facto rewards the
perjurer with victory in the suit; disproof of the denial does not constitute an admis-
sion. See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
,0, See authorities cited in notes 97, 98 supra.
' Stevens, Ethics and the Statute of Frauds, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 355, 381 (1952).
Professor Degnan calls this "a curious inversion of the Statute." Degnan, The Evidence
Law of Discovery: Exclusion of Evidence Because of Fear of Perjury, 43 TEX. L. REv.
435, 448 (1965).
11 2 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 275, at 3 (1950); Dean Robert Foster, Reporter's
Comments, 2A CODE OF LAWS OF S.C. § 10.2-201, at 61 (1966); Rationale to
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 207, at 464 (Tentative Draft Nos. 1-7, 1973).
10 Sealock v. Hackley, 186 Md. 49, 53, 45 A.2d 744, 746 (1946).
10 185 Md. 47, 42 A.2d 905 (1945). See text accompanying note 21 supra.
' 145 Md. at 55; 42 A.2d at 908.
,o 6 BENDER'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERV. § 2-201, at 1-59, and § 8-319, at
1-613 (1967).
'1 6 BENDER'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERV. § 2-201 at 1-58 (1967).
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F. Judicial Interpretation of the Code Admission Provision
No Code case opposed to the use of an involuntary admission to
satisfy the Statute of Frauds has been found, and there have been
only a few suggestions of possible judicial authority opposed to its
use." 9 The courts in Cox v. Cox"' and Weiss v. Wolin,"' although
asserting that the question of the use of an involuntary admission was
not before them and that they were not answering the question, indi-
cated that there are cases opposed to its use but cited none. Similarly,
in Presti v. Wilson"' the court held the admission provision inapplic-
able because the defendant denied the contract. The court then re-
marked that the cases are in conflict on the question, citing as op-
posed to the use of an involuntary admission only one pre-Code case
which the court indicated might not be authority under the Code."'
It has been suggested"' that cases such as Williamson v. Martz,"
' See note 53 supra. Professor Hawkland states that judges disagree on the ques-
tion whether an involuntary admission can be used to satisfy the Code Statute of
Frauds, but he cites no case opposed to its use and seems to have in mind pre-Code
decisions.
110 289 So.2d 609, 613 n.3 (Ala. 1974). The only authority opposed to the involun-
tary admission doctrine cited is Anderson. See note 54 supra; Annot. 17 A.L.R. 3d 1010
(1968), discussed in the text accompanying note 117 infra.
" 60 Misc.2d 750, 303 N.Y.S.2d 940 (Sup. Ct. 1969). The only citation of author-
ity opposed to the use of an involuntary admission is the New York Law Revision
Commission Report which found the 1952 version of the Code admission provision
possibly ambiguous in its application to an involuntary admission. See text accompa-
nying note 48 supra. The case is discussed in note 117 infra.
112 348 F. Supp. 543 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
l The court stated:
There is New York law indicating that an admission in a deposition
is involuntary and does not take the case out of the statute of frauds.
Smith v. Muss . . . . The New York decision dealt only with the
question whether a deposition was a 'memorandum' of the sale, since
the Uniform Commercial Code, with its express exception for an ad-
mission of the contract, had not yet been adopted.
348 F. Supp. at 545.
"' 17 A.L.R. 3d 1010, 1141 (1968).
"' 29 NORTHUM. L.J. 32, 11 Pa. D & C.2d 33 (Ct. Com. Pls. 1956).
A similar case in Scarpinato v. National Patent Development Corp., 75 Misc. 2d
94, 347 N.Y.S.2d 623 (Sup. Ct. 1973). The court stated:
[Tihe plaintiffs fail because assuming the existence of an [oral]
agreement containing an option to purchase stock it is unenforceable
since '[a] contract for the sale of securities is not enforceable by way
of action or defense unless . . . (a) there is some writing signed by the
party against whom enforcement is sought. . .' U.C.C. § 8-319.
75 Misc. at 97, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 625. The admission provision was not mentioned.
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are opposed to the use of the involuntary admission. This was a case
where a complaint was dismissed on the ground that it showed that
the oral contract sued on was unenforceable under the Statute of
Frauds in that the part payment alleged was not sufficient to satisfy
the Statute. There is no suggestion that the court in this case consid-
ered the possibility of using an involuntary admission and deter-
mined that it was improper. The case is therefore no authority on this
proposition. Thus, no case decided under the Code admission provi-
sion opposes the use of an involuntary admission to satisfy the Stat-
ute of Frauds.
While some Code cases apply the admission provision without
indicating whether the admission was voluntary or involuntary,"'
and others give limited support to the involuntary admission
doctrine," 7 the following Code cases clearly support the use of the
involuntary admission to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.
In Dagerfield v. Markel,"' the trial court had striken seller's coun-
terclaim for damages for buyer's failure to accept delivery of potatoes
under an oral sales contract on the ground the contract was unen-
"I E.g., Oregon Ridge Dinner Theatre, Inc. v. Hamlin, 253 Md. 462, 253 A.2d 382
(1969). The defendant had "conceded on the record that there was [an] agreement"
to transfer shares of stock. The court said, in response to defendant's objection that
the agreement was unenforceable under § 8-319, "[W]e think that [defendant's]
concession of record that such agreement was made gratifies [sic] the statute." 253
Md. at 468, 253 A.2d at 385. See also Blankenfeld v. Smith, 290 Minn. 475, 188 N.W.2d
872 (1971); Ellis Canning Co. v. Bernstein, 11 UCC Rep. Serv. 443 (D. Colo. 1972).
Ellis Canning was an action for breach of an oral contract to sell stock. The parties'
tape recording of the contract was submitted in evidence, apparently by plaintiff; and
defendant "at time of trial acknowledged its accuracy." The court gave defendant's
admission of the contract as an alternate ground for holding the contract enforceable.
In so holding, the court cited UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8-319(d). It seems likely
that defendant's "acknowledgement" of the accuracy of the tape came at the request
of plaintiff or the court, rather than sua sponte, but the opinion does not state this as
a fact.
I I E.g., Weiss v. Wolin, 60 Misc.2d 750, 303 N.Y.S.2d 940 (Sup. Ct. 1969). In
denying defendant's motion to dismiss a complaint which sought to enforce an oral
contract to sell securities as premature under § 8-319(d), the court said, "an analogy
may be drawn to those cases which have enunciated the principle . . . [that] sum-
mary judgment will be denied because the facts are wholly within the knowledge of
the moving party and might be disclosed by cross-examination or examination before
trial." 60 Misc. at 753, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 943. However, the court expressly stated,
"Whether or not the defendant can be compelled to submit to an examination before
trial and to deny or admit the making of the agreement which plaintiff pleads need
not be determined at this time." 60 Misc. at 753, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 943. See mention of
this case in text accompanying note 111 supra; Freeman v. Applied Digital Data
Systems, Inc. 7 UCC REP. SERV. 1052, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970).
I's 222 N.W.2d 373 (North Dakota 1974).
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forceable under the Statute. In vacating the order striking the coun-
terclaim because of procedural errors and returning the case for addi-
tional proceedings consistent with its opinion, the North Dakota Su-
preme Court stated:
[S]ome observations on the application of the Statute of
Frauds appear in order . . . . Subsection [2-201] 3(b) of the
statute contains an exception which is in issue here . . . . It
is to be noted that . . . other provisions of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. . . do not contain these exceptions to nonenfor-
ceability of an oral contract .... "I The exception contem-
plates that for this type of agreement, involving sale of goods,
a less strict standard be applied. The other party to the pur-
ported agreement may be required' to admit or deny the oral
agreement. If it is legally enforced it must be on the testimony
of the party against whom it is sought to be enforced.
2
1
The Iowa Supreme Court, in Quad County Grain, Inc. v. Poe'
2
affirmed a judgment enforcing an oral contract for the delivery of corn
because "[d]efendant's testimony, both as an adverse witness called
by plaintiff and as a witness in his own behalf, establishes evidence





Similarly, the Georgia Supreme Court in Hale v. Higginbothom'2
upheld a lower court ruling that an oral contract to sell a quantity of
milk was enforceable on the basis of defendant's admission of the
contract made on cross examination at the trial, saying without elab-
oration that the contract was enforceable, "since the seller admitted
in his testimony that the contract of sale, as alleged in the plaintiffs
complaint, was made. See. . . 2-201(3)(b)."1u
In Cohn v. Fisher,'2 a New Jersey Superior Court, in an action for
breach of an oral contract for the sale of a boat, granted plaintiff's
"1 222 N.W.2d at 377. The Court also stated, "The contract for the sale of goods
is treated differently than the sale of other personal property (Section 41-01-16, NDCC
[U.C.C. § 1-206]) or security agreements (Section 41-09-16, NDCC [U.C.C. § 9-
203])." Id. The court is in error as to the North Dakota securities Statute of Frauds,
which contains essentially the same admission provision as is contained in the sale of
goods Statute. N.D. CENTURY CODE § 41-08-35(4) (1968). See note 32 supra.
1" 222 N.W. at 378 (Emphasis added).
121 202 N.W.2d 118 (Iowa 1972).
"2 Id. at 120.
" 228 Ga. 823, 188 S.E.2d 515 (1972).
i2 228 Ga. at 862, 188 S.E.2d at 517.
in 118 N.J. Super. 286, 287 A.2d 222 (1972).
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motion for summary judgment in support of which plaintiff had sub-
mitted defendant's admission of the contract contained in his re-
sponse to demands for admissions made on him and in his deposition.
The court noted Professor Hawkland's doubt as to the propriety of
using an involuntary admission to satisfy the Statute and his argu-
ment that "the defendant should be privileged not to make the ad-
mission if it has the legal effect of depriving him of the defense of the
Statute of Frauds," then stated:
This court is of the opinion that if a party admits an oral
contract, he should be held bound to his bargain. The statute
of frauds was not designed to protect a party who made an oral
contract, but rather to aid a party who did not make a con-
tract, though one is claimed to have been made orally with
him. This court would therefore hold that the check [which
contained a memorandum of the contract] together with the
defendant's admission of an oral contract, would constitute an
enforceable contract under . . . 2-201(3)(b). '26
Although defendant's admission in response to the demand for ad-
missions was involuntary, the opinion does not show whether his
admission in his deposition came as a result of plaintiff's questioning;
possibly the deposition admission was volunteered and conceivably
the court is enforcing the contract solely on the basis of such a volun-
tary admission, but even so the court is rather clearly rejecting Hawk-
land's arguments against involuntary admissions.
In re Particle Reduction Corp.,'1 was a bankruptcy case in a
United States District Court in Pennsylvania. The Referee had asked
the party against whom enforcement of an oral agreement to sell
electrical equipment was sought whether the agreement had been
made. The defendant had replied that he "guessed" so, and the court
held the oral contract enforceable under the admission provision,
without discussion. This admission, of course, was involuntary, com-
ing in response to the Referee's question.
In Garrison v. Piatt 8 the Georgia Court of Appeals held that a
demurrer to a petition which showed on its face that an oral contract
for the sale of a house trailer was within the Statute of Frauds was
improperly granted because the contract might thereafter be made
enforceable by the defendant's admission. The court stated that the
' 118 N.J. Super. at 296, 287 A.2d at 227.
5 UCC REP. SERV. 242 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
OS 113 Ga. App. 94, 147 S.E.2d 374 (1966). See analysis of criticism of this case in
text accompanying notes 69-70 supra.
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admission provision "was designed to prevent the statute of frauds
itself from becoming an aid to fraud" and "[i]f a demurrer on this
ground should be sustained to the petition, the plaintiff is denied his
opportunity of determining on trial whether the making of the con-
tract would be admitted and thus made enforceable for the first
time."'2 9 Surely this opportunity of plaintiff to determine if defendant
admits the contract would come on plaintiff's interrogation of defen-
dant.
Finally, the dispute in Reissman International Corp. v. J.S.O.
Wood Products, Inc.'30 arose when a New York Civil Court denied
defendant's motion for summary judgment made on the ground that
plaintiff's action on an oral contract for the sale of cabinets was
barred by the Statute of Frauds. The court stated:
This motion was brought on prior to any discovery proceed-
ings. The possibility exists that plaintiff there or on trial may
be able to obtain an admission by defendant of the entire
contract as claimed . . . .Whether or not plaintiff may,
through the use of discovery proceedings after answer obtain a
testimonial admission of the alleged contract from defendant
has not yet been passed on in New York . . . .This court
concludes that it may, and therefore . . . the motion seeking
a dismissal of the complaint is denied.' 3'
Judge Evans in his thorough opinion in this case dismissed Hawk-
land's doubt 3 ' and Anderson's denial'33 that an involuntary admis-
sion satisfies the Statute, pointing out that the Code admission provi-
sion was revised to make clear that it applies to admissions on cross
examinations, '3 and that the purpose of the Statute of Frauds is fully
satisfied by defendant's involuntary admission. ' Judge Evans also
took note of the pre-Code critics who condemned the old statute as a
haven for welshers,13' and cited the Code cases Cohn v. Fisher,"7
' 113 Ga. App. at 94, 95 147 S.E.2d at 375, 376.
1' 0 UCC REP. SERV. 1165 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972).
10 UCC REP. SERV. at 1167, 1168.
,"2 See note 53 supra.
11 See note 54 supra. The court pointed out that the authority cited by Anderson
does not support his position.
'13 The court quoted the portion of the 1960 New York Law Revision Commission
Report set out in note 49 supra.
,' See text accompanying notes 37-44 supra.
, See text accompanying notes 23-26 supra. The court cited approvingly Stevens,
Ethics and the Statute of Frauds, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 355 (1952).
,17 118 N.J. Super. 286, 287, A.2d 222 (1972). See note 125 and accompanying text
supra.
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Garrison v. Piatt'1 and In re Particle Reduction Corp. in support of
his position.
V. CONCLUSION: STATE OF THE LAW
Judge Evans' reasoning and conclusion in the Reissman case are
eminently sound and correct. There is no valid basis for doubting that
defendant's admission of an oral contract for the sale of goods or
investment securities, obtained by plaintiff's interrogation in court,
does satisfy the Code sales Statute of Frauds under its admission
provision.' 9 The purpose and policy of the Code sales Statute of
Frauds, the plain language and the history of the revision of its ad-
mission provision and all Code courts support this use of the involun-
tary admission.' 0
Consequently, where a party to such an oral contract knows that
the contract was made and would admit it on interrogation in court,
the contract is legally enforceable. Such a party is no longer able to
renege on his oral contract by asserting the Statute of Frauds. In
recognition of this doctrine, such party should, without compulsion
of the court, perform this oral contractual obligation just as he should
perform any other legal obligation enforceable in court.
Unfortunately, there is a widespread failure to recognize this in-
voluntary admission doctrine and thus a failure to appreciate that the
old pre-Code right to welsh by asserting the Statute of Frauds no
' 113 Ga. App. 94, 147 S.E.2d 374 (1966). See note 128 and accompanying text
supra.
"I, It should be noted that-even with a clear recognition of the application of the
Code admission provision to involuntary admissions, involuntary admission procedure
will not always be successful in enforcing an existing oral sales contract. It is never
available to enforce an oral contract where the party against whom enforcement is
sought denies the existence of the alleged contract. If the facts regarding the existence
of the alleged contract are, to his mind, ambiguous or uncertain, the party will deny
them. He may of course feign a loss of memory. Even where he realizes that the
contract was made, his interrogator's questions may not be successful in extracting the
facts of contracting from him. The Code admission provision can do nothing to prevent
his deliberately perjuring himself in denying the contract. These problems become
more serious when it is remembered that the admission provision provides that the oral
contract is not enforceable beyond the quantity (and, in the case of investment secu-
rity, the price) admitted. It therefore remains highly desirable for the parties to reduce
sales contracts to writing and not to rely on their enforcement by the Admission
Provision.
1"* It should be noted that even with a clear recognition of the involuntary admis-
sion doctrine, troublesome questions as to the meaning of the admission provision, and
as to the procedure for handling involuntary admissions will remain, which may re-
quire resolution by the courts or rule-making bodies.
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longer exists. The demise of the Statute of Frauds reneger has gone
largely unheralded. The Official Comment to the Statute has not
been revised to reflect the revision of the Statute which was made to
clarify its application to involuntary admissions. Most commentators
profess doubt as to the propriety of using the involuntary admission
to satisfy the Statute, and the great majority of sales and contract
treatises proclaim the same doubt. Those commentators who have
recognized the propriety of the use of the involuntary admission have
usually done so without elaboration or only inferentially. Only the
courts have firmly asserted that involuntary admissions do satisfy the
Statute of Frauds and their decisions have been little noted.
Considerable mischief has undoubtedly been done by the com-
mercial law commentators who have so widely disseminated this false
doctrine of doubt, and danger exists that the full benefits of the Code
admission provision in promoting honesty in sales contract relations
may be lost. It is therefore now incumbent upon these doubting com-
mentators to take heed of the unanimous decisions of the courts
which have found no basis for doubt, to reassess their own reasons for
such doubt, and unless they find the judicial authority unpersuasive
and their reasons for doubt compelling, to give full recognition and
support to the doctrine that involuntary admissions do satisfy the
Code sales Statute of Frauds.
